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Proposals for a European Banking Union must be redesigned
to provide a more accountable and effective institutional
framework.
by Blog Admin
The EU’s proposed banking union is seen by many as the first step towards resolving the
eurocrisis, and under current proposals, by 2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) will be
responsible for supervising over 6,000 banks in Europe. Kern Alexander  has serious
concerns about the accountability and capacity of the ECB in this potential role, and argues
that its primary focus of maintaining price stability in the eurozone through monetary policy
is very different to that of banking supervision. In order for them to be effective, the
proposals must be strengthened with greater mechanisms to ensure that the ECB is
adequately accountable for its supervisory decisions.
In June 2012, as Spanish authorit ies desperately negotiated with the European Commission over the
terms of  an EU bailout f or the Spanish banking system, the European Union President, Herman Van
Rompuy, issued a paper calling f or a European Banking Union that would sever the vicious link between
banking crisis and sovereign debt crisis. The Van Rompuy paper proposed vast new powers f or the
European Central Bank (ECB) to supervise over 6,000 banks in the eurozone and to establish an EU-
wide deposit guarantee scheme, along with creating an EU-wide bank resolution f und that would
administer f ailing banks without imposing direct costs on taxpayers. The German Chancellor Angela
Merkel welcomed the proposals as an important step in obtaining German support f or allowing the
eurozone bailout f und – the European Stability Mechanism – to recapitalise ailing eurozone banks.
European Council Ministers then issued a decision supporting the Van Rompuy proposal, and on 12
September the European Commission proposed a regulation that would provide the European Central
Bank with banking supervision powers and another regulation to enable the ECB to interact with the
European Banking Authority in executing its supervisory powers.
The ECB’s supervisory powers would be phased- in between January 2013 and January 2014 with the
creation of  a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) that would have an executive board – a Single
Supervisory Board (SSB) – which would init ially oversee eurozone banks that have accepted bailouts. On
1 July 2013, the ECB/SSB would gain supervisory oversight of  the largest cross-border credit institutions
and f inancial holding companies, and on 1 January 2014 its authority would extend to an estimated 6,000
banking institutions across the euro area. The ECB/SSB will be primarily responsible f or licensing,
monitoring and enf orcing prudential regulations, such as capital adequacy requirements, liquidity buf f ers
and leverage limits, against banks based in the eurozone. The ECB/SSB will also be empowered to
approve bank recovery plans and asset transf ers between af f iliates within banking groups or mixed
f inancial conglomerates.
These proposals represent a dramatic institutional
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These proposals represent a dramatic institutional
restructuring of  eurozone and EU banking supervision and
will have important implications f or the practice of  banking
supervision in all EU states. They are primarily designed to
sever the link between banking f ragility and over- indebted
sovereigns by authorising the European Stability Mechanism
to recapitalise ailing euro area banks on the condition that
these banks are subject to strict ECB supervision and
conditionality. The UK government have tentatively
supported the proposals, but on the condition that they do
not result in limitations on market access f or UK banks and
f inancial f irms in the eurozone. These sweeping new
proposed powers f or the ECB raise serious concerns about
accountability and institutional capacity to carry out these
f unctions.
The EU Treaty establishes in Article 130 a strong f orm of
independence f or the ECB in deciding what measures it
should use to conduct monetary policy and to achieve its
primary objective of  price stability. Indeed, the ECB’s
independence is widely considered to be why it has been
viewed as a strong and credible institution in managing the
value of  the euro and maintaining price stability. It is
unsurprising theref ore why some would advocate that this credibility be extended in the f orm of  banking
supervision powers.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that monetary policy and banking supervision are very dif f erent.
Monetary policy usually involves the use of  a f ew macro instruments – i.e., interest rates and the quantity
of  money – to achieve price stability, a measurable objective of ten def ined as keeping inf lation within a
range or below a target rate, and involving a more-or- less predictable trade-of f  between inf lation and
unemployment. Strong legal guarantees of  central bank independence have been considered necessary
in f ulf illing the price stability mandate. Banking supervision, on the other hand, has a wider number of  –
of ten conf licting – objectives: f inancial stability, investor and depositor protection, consumer protection
and tackling f inancial crime. Moreover, it is much more dif f icult to measure whether these objectives have
been met and what the economic trade-of f s are in achieving them. Also, bank supervisors have the
power to restrict and restructure property and contractual rights – belonging to individual f irms,
depositors, shareholders and creditors – and in doing so to utilise a f ar greater number of  regulatory
instruments than is available in monetary policy.
Banking supervision has been subjected to greater accountability mechanisms by allowing, f or example,
that f irms and individuals be consulted bef ore they are subjected to controls and that the content of
regulations are clearly ascertainable in advance and proportionate to achieve a legit imate regulatory aim
and can be challenged by those subject to them bef ore a f air and impartial tribunal. Unlike monetary
policy, banking supervision requires dif f erent institutional mechanisms to ensure a more equal balance
between the independence and accountability of  the bank supervisor. The ECB’s strong f orm of
independence – as established by the Treaty – is inappropriate as a policy matter f or a modern bank
supervisor, and without adequate accountability mechanisms would likely contravene the legal principle of
the rule of  law.
Moreover, the exercise of  macro-supervision and regulation will require the ECB/SSM to take decisions
that may impinge on member states’ economic policies and af f ect economic policy management by other
EU institutions, such as the Parliament, Council and Commission. For example, if  the ECB/SSB were to
decide to impose countercyclical capital requirements or loan to value or loan to income limits, it would
have a direct ef f ect on the terms of  f inancial contracts used on a daily basis by consumers and
businesses. The exercise of  these powers would raise questions regarding the ECB’s accountability f or
these decisions to member states and EU institutions. The ECB’s limited f orm of  accountability –
presently only being required to give oral evidence to the European Parliament to explain its policies – in
terms of  its governance structure to other EU institutions and to member states would be inadequate
f or the exercise of  bank supervision powers.
The proposals also do not address the ECB’s institutional limitations as a bank supervisor. In an era
where global f inancial policymakers have accepted the importance of  macro-prudential regulation as
extending f rom licensing to resolution, it is striking that the proposal f or an ECB/SSM only provides ex
ante prudential supervisory powers f or the ECB, without any mention of  bank resolution powers. Most
regulators now agree that ef f ective regulation requires a seamless process f rom crisis prevention
through crisis management, but under the proposals the ECB would not be authorised to engage in crisis
management, nor would it be permitted to resolve a too-big-to-f ail bank, or to use public f unds to
f inance a bank bail-out. Under these proposals, the ECB’s ult imate ef f ectiveness can be called into
question.
Is it really realistic to give the ECB ex ante responsibilit ies f or micro and macro-prudential supervision
while not having the authority to resolve, bail-out, nationalise or unwind a large cross-border bank or to
engage in other types of  f inancial rescue? The necessary link between crisis prevention and crisis
management is ignored in these proposals and without adequate recognition of  the ECB’s role in bank
resolution, the proposed regulations are destined to f ail to achieve their objective of  controlling systemic
risk and enhancing macro-prudential regulation in the euro area. In addition, the ECB becoming a bank
supervisor might bring it into conf lict with its main objective of  price stability. According to this view, the
ECB might be tempted to lower interest rates or to loosen conditions f or bank access to liquidity in order
to stabilise the banking sector, but this might lead to easier terms of  credit thereby interf ering with its
price stability objective. However, the proposed regulation attempts to address this potential conf lict by
requiring that bank supervision decisions and monetary policy be strictly separated, but both are
ultimately accountable to the ECB’s Governing Council.
The Commission’s proposals do not provide the necessary institutional mechanisms to ensure that the
ECB/SSM is adequately accountable f or its supervisory decisions to those subject to its controls and to
other EU institutions and member states. This can be attributed to the ECB’s strong f orm of
independence that is set f orth in the Treaty. This is particularly problematic given the anticipated broad
range of  powers that the ECB is expected to exercise as a macro-prudential supervisor that will likely
have a direct impact on economic policy. Furthermore, the proposals do not address the institutional
limitations that could potentially restrict the ECB’s legal authority under the Treaty to engage in macro-
prudential supervision, nor do they stipulate how the ECB would interact with member state authorit ies
with respect to bank resolution. These outstanding issues suggest that continued work on a European
Banking Union is needed in order to design a more accountable and ef f ective institutional f ramework that
can better achieve regulatory objectives.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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